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Abstract 
 
In their seminal paper Fuhrer and Moore (1995) provide an explanation for the existence 
of inflation inertia. Driscoll and Holden (2003) argue that under more plausible assumptions 
the model of Fuhrer and Moore (1995) will coincide with the model of Taylor (1979) which 
can only explain sticky prices but not sticky inflation. Following the suggestions by Driscoll 
and Holden (2003) we extend their setting allowing for other-regarding preferences. It turns 
out that this new extended model is consistent with the one by Fuhrer and Moore (1995). This 
means that, even under the strong assumption of rational expectations, inflation is not only 
governed by its future expected but also by its past values. This is in line with empirical 
findings. 
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One of the challenges in macroeconomics still is to explain the tradeoff between inflation and 
unemployment. The model by Fuhrer and Moore (1995) is one which captures the data to a 
comparably high degree (Mankiw 2001). Especially, and in contrast to its predecessor models 
by Taylor (1980) and Calvo (1983), the Fuhrer-Moore-model is capable to reproduce inflation 
persistence instead of mere price inertia. Consequently, models of the Fuhrer-Moore-type are 
widely used in empirical macroeconomic research (e.g., Brayton and Tinsley (1996), Brayton 
et al. (1997), Coenen and Wieland (2005), Smets and Wouters (2003)). 
Driscoll and Holden (2003), however, argue that the model by Fuhrer and 
Moore (1995) is theoretically not as plausible as it seems to be at first glance. According to 
them in an overlapping scheme wage setters should determine their nominal wages so that 
their expected future and current real wages are equal to those of other workers whose 
nominal wages are fixed in the present period. In contrast, Fuhrer and Moore (1995) argue to 
set current real wages equal to the average of other workers’ real wages in the preceding and 
following period. Driscoll and Holden (2003) show that under their proposed modifications 
the Fuhrer-Moore model collapses to that of Taylor (1980) in which current inflation only 
depends on the expected future inflation and on the output gap. As their modified relative real 
wage contracting model does no more lead to inflation inertia Driscoll and Holden (2003) 
argue in favor of behavioral models which do not rely on full rationality and self-centeredness 
but informational restrictions (Roberts 1998, Ball 2000, Mankiw and Reis 2002) and 
fairness (Driscoll and Holden 2002). 
Although we generally agree with Driscoll and Holden’s (2003) critique on Fuhrer and 
Moore (1995) we pursue a diametral line in treating this issue. Instead of refusing Fuhrer and 
Moore’s (1995) model as a sound quasi-microfoundation of inflation persistence we ask what 
subjects might have in mind when they follow the shortcut suggested by Fuhrer and 
Moore (1995). Speaking differently, in this note we do not ask whether their model is in line 
with standard microeconomic assumptions but we examine under which behavioral 
assumption macroeconomic results are received which turn out to be observably equivalent to 
those of Fuhrer and Moore (1995). 
In Section I we briefly describe the model by Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and show how 
it is reduced to Taylor (1980) under the Driscoll and Holden (2003) modification. In 
Section II we structurally expand the Driscoll and Holden (2003) model in order to allow for 
subjects with other-regarding preferences. Both the expanded Driscoll and Holden (2003) and 
the Fuhrer and Moore (1995) setup are transformed to their basics, i.e. the contract wages, and 
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are compared by the method of undetermined coefficients (McCallum 1983). Finally, the 
results of this comparison are discussed. 
 
I. The Fuhrer and Moore model and the Driscoll and Holden critique 
The model of Fuhrer and Moore (1995) bases on the assumption of overlapping wage 
contracts. Half of the wages are negotiated in each period and still will be valid in the 
following period. In that period the other half of the wages are set which in turn are valid for 
two periods. 
Fuhrer and Moore (1995, p. 131) assume that in “... the relative wage specification ... 
agents compare the real value of their wage contracts with the real value of wage contracts 
previously negotiated and still in effect, and with contracts expected to be negotiatied over the 
duration of the contract ...”. Additionally, current real wages are influenced by the size of the 
output gap3. These assumptions lead to the following real wage equation: 
 
( ) ( ) tttttttt kypxEpxpx +−+−=− ++−− 11211121   (1) 
 
where xt is the log deviation of the nominal contract wage, pt the log deviation of the 
price level, yt the log deviation of the output from equilibrium in period t and k>0 a is 
constant parameter. 
Firms set prices as a constant unit markup over wage costs. Therefore, current prices pt 
are the average of the contract wages set in the previous and current period: 
 
( )121 −+= ttt xxp   (2) 
 
Inserting (2) into (1), we obtain 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) tttttttt kyxxExxxx +−+−=− +−−− 1412141121   (3) 
 
or 
 
ttttt kyxExx 212
1
12
1 +∆+∆=∆ +−   (3’) 
                                                 
3 By relating current wage setting only to the current value of the output gap, we follow the general reception of 
Fuhrer and Moore (1995) in the literature (e.g., Roberts (1997), Walsh (2003), Driscoll and Holden (2003). 
Originally, Fuhrer and Moore (1995) also assumed an influence of the expected future output gap Etyt+1 on 
current real wages xt-pt. 
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 As 11 −− ∆+∆=∆=−= tttttt xxpppπ , current inflation is determined according to 
 
( )1121121 2 −−+ +++= tttttt yykE πππ   (4) 
 
Equation (4) shows that current inflation depends not only on the state of the business 
cycle and on expected inflation but also on its past values. This result is in stark contrast to 
earlier models of inflation dynamics (esp., Taylor 1980, Calvo 1983) which claim that 
inflation should not be driven by its lagged values. 
Driscoll and Holden (2003) cast doubt on the plausibility of Fuhrer and 
Moore’s (1995) microfoundation. In general, they agree with the idea of heading for on 
average equal real wages over the contract period. In particular, however, Driscoll and 
Holden (2003) question Fuhrer and Moore’s (1995, p. 131) notion of the “real value of wage 
contracts previously negotiated and still in effect” formally repesented by . And 
indeed, for most economies where wages are negotiated in non-indexed nominal terms and 
prices are market results Driscoll and Holden’s (2003) formal translation into  seems 
to be the more appropriate representation of the current real value of “... wage[s] ... still in 
effect ...”. Unfortunately, neither Fuhrer and Moore (1995) nor Driscoll and Holden (2003) 
are very explicit on the legal framework of the labor market which would be the critical issue. 
11 −− − tt px
tt px −−1
As we follow Driscoll and Holden’s (2003) proposition to evaluate wages at the price 
level of the economically relevant but not the original contract period, we get (instead of 
equation (1)): 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) tttttttttt kypxEpxpEpx +−+−=+− ++−+ 1121121121   (5) 
 
where the current real wage target on the LHS is related to other workers’ expected 
real value wages during the contract period and the business cycle conditions, both shown on 
the RHS. As easily can be seen, the price levels in (5) cancel out and a overlapping nominal 
wage specification remains: 
 
ttttt kyxExx ++= +− 121121   (6) 
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which was introduced to the literature by Taylor (1980). Consequently, the 
differentiation of (2) and its substitution by (6) leads to an inflation equation 
 
( )11 −+ ++= ttttt yykEππ   (7) 
 
already presented by Taylor (1980). Equation (7) predicts inflation not to be persistent 
(Fuhrer and Moore 1995). 
 
II. The extension of Driscoll and Holden’s (2003) idea 
Driscoll and Holden (2003) interpret the fact that their version of the relative real wage 
specification (in results) coincides with Taylor (1980) as evidence that the Fuhrer and 
Moore (1995) model has no potential to theoretically explain inflation inertia. As a 
consequence they refer in their conclusions to other attempts in the recent literature to 
reproduce inflation persistence. Whereas the major part of the mentioned work relies on 
cognitive (Roberts 1998, Ball 2000) and institutional (Mankiw and Reis 2002) restrictions of 
information processing, their own contribution to solve the problem has a very distinct 
starting point. In Driscoll and Holden (2002) inflation persistence is described as a 
consequence of a coordination problem which in turn is caused by workers’ preferences for 
fair treatment. 
In contrast to Driscoll and Holden (2003) we do not draw the conclusion to generally 
abandon Fuhrer and Moore (1995) as an explanation for inflation persistence. Instead, we 
follow the arguments of Driscoll and Holden (2003) in a literal way: We take their version of 
the real wage equation as a starting point and, in line with their suggestions, add a term which 
allows for fairness preference. Then, we rearrange the resulting new wage equation so that it 
can be compared to the one by Fuhrer and Moore (1995). For the comparison we apply the 
method of undetermined coefficients (McCallum 1983) in order to assess whether or in which 
range the model of Fuhrer and Moore (1995) is observably equivalent to our new model 
which is based on an undisputed microfoundation. In our opinion this course of actions, i.e., 
to challenge and not to abandon the Fuhrer and Moore (1995) model, is an appropriate way to 
cope with Driscoll and Holden’s (2003) critique because the Fuhrer and Moore (1995) model 
seemed to be in line with researchers’ conventional wisdom and empirical results for many 
years. 
To represent other-regarding preferences in the wage equation we propose the 
reciprocity model of Falk and Fischbacher (2005). Although it originally focuses on another 
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topic, namely the role of intentions in context of fairness and reciprocity, it is helpful for our 
task. It is a tractable model that describes fair behavior at sequential points of time. This 
dimension of the model is of great importance as inflation by its nature is always a 
consequence of dynamic decision-making. Taking, for simplicity, intentions and other 
behavioral parameters as given and constant, Falk and Fischbacher (2005) tell us that 
individuals’ fairness utility depends on current and past relative payoffs. We limit the 
influence of past relative payoffs to the previous period as this time horizon reflects the 
duration of wage contracts. Treating current relative wages as done in Driscoll and 
Holden’s (2003) specification we receive a new real wage equation of the type: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]12111121121121 −−−−++−+ −−−++−+−=+− tttttttttttttt pxpxkypxEpxpEpx γ  (8) 
 
where 0>γ  is the weight of the additional fairness term. Equation (8) states that, 
ceteris paribus, workers’ real wage aspiration is higher the relatively higher other workers’ 
real wages (  have been in the previous period, compared to own real 
wages . By doing so workers attempt to compensate last period’s lack in fairness 
by a higher current wage that provides higher current and future payoffs in absolute as well as 
in relative terms. 
)
)
11 −− − tt px
( 12 −− − tt px
Cancelling out the price levels and sorting contract wages and the output gap to 
different sides of the equation, we get: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )12121121 −−−+ −+−+−= tttttttt xxxxxExky γ   (9) 
 
or, more generally, 
 
( ) ( ) ( )1211 −−−+ −+−+−= tttttttt xxxxxExky γβα   (10) 
 
Now, we can see that the new real wage specification linearly relates the current 
output gap  to a weightened average of the relative (nominal) wages in the current, 
previous, and next period. Furthermore, this general representation will turn out to be 
convenient for the reconciliation with its pendant associated with Fuhrer and Moore (1983). 
ty
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If we take the sum of (10) and (10) lagged and double it, we receive4: 
 
( ) ( ) 32111 222222 −−−+− +−−++−=+ tttttttt xxxxxEyyk γβγαβα   (10’) 
 
similar to equation (4). Substituting (2) in (4) (where 1−−= ttt ppπ ), we get 
 
( ) 32111 4
1
2
10
2
1
4
12 −−−+− +−⋅++−=+ tttttttt xxxxxEyyk   (11) 
 
The comparison of the coefficients of (10’) and (11) delivers five conditions: 
 
8
1
4
12 =⇔−=− αα    (12.1) 
4
1
2
12 =⇔= ββ    (12.2) 
( ) γαγα =⇔=− 02    (12.3) 
4
1
2
12 =⇔−=− ββ    (12.4) 
8
1
4
12 =⇔= γγ    (12.5) 
 
As the requirements of (12.1), (12.5), and (12.3) as well as of (12.2) and (12.4) are 
consistent to each other, a single solution is obtained: 814181 ;; === γβα . The existence of 
this solution means that the inflation dynamics predicted by Fuhrer and Moore (1995) is 
observably equivalent to the one of our proposed economy with overlapping wage contracts, 
markup pricing, and a wage setting behavior according to 
 
( ) ( ) ( )1281141181 −−−+ −+−+−= tttttttt xxxxxExky   (13) 
 
In other words, wage setters of the Fuhrer and Moore (1983) type might be thought as relating 
past, present and future relative wages to the current output gap, ascribing double weight to 
the present period’s wages. 
                                                 
4 For simplicity, we drop the expectational error η = Et-1xt - xt. 
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Solving (13) for xt and evaluating nominal wages by the respective price level leads to 
the type of representation which is already known from Driscoll and Holden (2003) 
(equation 5): 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]12113138113113213132 −−−−++−+ −−−++−+−=−− tttttttttttttt pxpxkypxEpxpEpx  (8’), 
 
In contrast to Driscoll and Holden (2003), the wage setters described by equation (8’) also 
care for fairness in the previous period, they react more sensitively to the output gap, and, in 
general, ascribe a higher weight to present period outcomes. 
 
III. Discussion and conclusions 
We have derived and shown in which way wage setters behave in an economy which 
is characterized by overlapping contracts in the labor market and persistent inflation in the 
goods market: Workers currently in charge to negotiate their wages try to set their nominal 
wages so that for the contract period the weightened average of their real wages (LHS of 8’) is 
equal to that of the other, fixed workers, corrected by the current business cycle conditions 
and the degree of fairness of last period outcomes (RHS of 8’). In other words, this is what 
workers might really have in mind or what might be the unconscious determinants when a 
wage setting heuristic of the Fuhrer and Moore (1995) type is applied. 
Furthermore, the concrete coefficients turn out to be plausible to many respect: First, it 
seems to be a successful strategy for the wage setters to attach more importance to the 
current (β) than to the future period (α). As real economies are subject to stochastic shocks 
and, consequently, future developments are hard to predict forecasting and related wage 
setting errors might have strong negative consequences (such as unemployment). Insofar, a 
concentration on the current value of others’ wages is an appropriate strategy. Secondly, a 
stronger weight on the present period is also in line with the phenomenon of time preference 
which is not explicitly modelled in this class of simple macro-models. Thirdly, a limited 
effect of the fair or unfair character of last period outcome (γ) reflects the rationale that the 
utility inferred from other subjects’ payoffs never should overweight that of own material 
benefits. Furthermore, a minor weight on past fairness might be explained by the fact that the 
other workers have not been entirely free in setting wages in the previous period as their 
decision was conditioned on the then output gap (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986). 
Insofar, a fair or unfair outcome might be considered as partially unintended (Falk and 
Fischbacher 2005). 
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Of course, proving that the new wage equation is consistent with Fuhrer and 
Moore’s (1995) outcome provides the fairness motive only as a potential explanation for 
inflation persistence. Other foundations of inflation persistence such as adaptive expectations 
(Roberts 1997, 1998; Ball 2000), sticky informations (Mankiw and Reis 2002), and habit 
formations (Fuhrer 2000, Amato and Laubach 2003) are still reasonable alternative. Which 
deviation of the purely neoclassical assumptions or which even bundle of deviations finally 
will prove to be causal for inflation inertia is up to further research. For now and from a 
macroeconomic perspective, the Fuhrer and Moore (1995) model can be behaviorally 
justified. 
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